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More on the Effects of Divisive Primaries 0 
JOHN C. COMER 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
There seems to be a widespread belief among political commentators 
and political analysts that primary elections, particularly those that 
divide the party at either the organizational or electoral level, undermine 
the capacity of the party to wage an effective general election campaign. 
They reason that party activists, as well as rank and file voters, who 
prefer a candidate that loses a hard fought primary will be less willing 
to work, campaign, and vote for the party's candidate in the general 
election. Indeed, hard fought contests may ev.en drive the loser's sup-
porters to the opposition. It seems plausible that those who support a 
loser in the primary might be somewhat less motivated in the November 
campaign than if their candidate had won. Conversely, those who sup-
port a winner may be more enthusiastic. While there is a great deal of 
supposition and impre_ssion regarding the negative effects of divisive 
primaries on party and candidate electoral fortunes, there is still relatively 
little in the way of systematic evidence to support the argument. Using 
the county as a unit of analysis, this paper examines the impact of 
primary divisiveness at the electoral level on a measure of general elec-
tion performance in the 1970 elections for governor and U. S. Senate 
in Ohio. It also examines the impact on election performance of support 
for winning and losing primary candidates among county party chair-
men. Thus, the analysis combines an examination of two components of 
party divisiveness in primary elections, the electoral and organizational. 
Relevant Literature 
The divisive effects of primary elections on party organization is a 
recurrent theme in the literature on political parties. V. 0. Key writes, 
for example, that the adoption of the direct primary opened the way for 
disruptive forces that gradually fractionalized the party organization. 
The primary, Key suggests, permitted direct appeals by politicians to 
party members and rank and file which generated factions and cliques 
attached to individual candidates. 1 Frank Sorauf echoes these feelings. 
0 The author wishes to thank Susan Welch, Department of Political Science, 
University of Nebraska, for her helpful comments on the manuscript. 
'1 V. 0. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed., New York: Thomas 
Y. Crowell Company, 1964), p. 342. 
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He notes that primaries pit party worker against party worker, party 
group against party group, resulting in deep wounds slow to heal. He 
suggests that the cost to the health and strength of the party is con-
siderable. 2 Add to these comments the impressions of political com-
mentators, and the evidence for the debilitating effects of primary elec-
tions on political parties is compelling. 3 
However, Andrew Hacker concludes that a divisive primary is little 
more likely than a non divisive primary to influence a candidate's elec-
tion chances. Using aggregate election data, Hacker analyzed 220 elec-
tions for governor and U. S. senator for the period 1956 to 1964. De-
fining a divisive primary as one where the winner received less than 
65 percent of the vote, he finds other factors more significant than the 
nature of the primary to general election success. Incumbency, the com-
petitive position of the parties, the office contested, and turnout are 
associated with winning. With these factors controlled, he concludes 
there is no difference in success between those with divisive primaries 
and those without. 4 Bernstein, however, has replicated a portion of 
Hacker's analysis and observes the opposite. Noting that Hacker mis-
interpreted his findings, Bernstein concludes divisive primaries do in-
deed lessen a candidate's chances in the general election, and this is 
true with both the effects of incumbency and party competition con-
trolled. Examining 293 elections for the U. S. Senate between 1956 and 
1972, he finds incumbents less likely to win re-election when they won 
nomination by less than 20 percent of the vote. In competitive situations, 
he observes that the harmful effects of a divisive primary are even more 
pronounced, incumbents rarely winning when their primary victory is 
close and rarely losing when it is the opposition primary that is close.G 
In a somewhat more narrowly based study, Clem and Meier note 
only a slight correlation between a divisive primary and general election 
success. Examining elections for governor , U. S. senator, and U. S. 
representative from 1946 to 1974 in South Dakota , they observe that 
contested primaries on occasion lead to greater general election margins 
than expected. They comment that contested primaries may add to a 
candidate's visibility, particularly for the out-party, and as a result, 
2 Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics in America ( 4th ed., Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1980), p. 213. 
8 The Making of the President, 1960, quoted in Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics 
in America (4th ed., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), p . 213. 
4 Andrew Hacker, "Does a Divisive Primary Harm a Candidate's Election 
Chances?" American Political Science Review , 59 ( 1965 ), 105-110. 
11 Robert A. Bernstein, "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt : U. S. Senate Races, 1956-
1972," American Political Science Review, 71 (Jun e, 1977), 540-545. 
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greater election success. In short, they conclude divisive primaries need 
not hurt a candidate's election chances , nor need non divisive primaries 
belp.s Studies such as these are , however, somewhat limited in that they 
only treat aggregate election data. Frank Sorauf has pointed out, for 
example, that they do not rule out the possibility of a general harm to 
and weakening of the party organization. 7 
Johnson and Gibson address themselves in a way to Sorauf's point 
in a study of campaign workers in a congressional election in Iowa. The 
authors examined primary and general election activity among Re-
publican and Democratic activists who supported and worked for op-
posing primary candidates. Their concern was the impact of winning 
and losing on motivation. Do those who support a primary loser move 
from the defeated candidate to the victor, or do they withdraw from 
political activity? Or what effects, if any, are produced by a divisive 
primary? Are the effects permanent or are they temporary? 
The authors conclude that a divisive primary depletes the number 
of persons available to work for the organization in the general election 
and that the party organization is splintered. One-half of the campaign 
workers reported being more active in the primary than the general 
election. Three-fourths of those who supported a loser were less active, 
while only one-fourth of those who supported a winner reported less 
activity. Better than 12 percent of the campaign workers indicated that 
they were going to vote for the opposition party in November. Another 
5 to 7 percent were undecided or responded that they would vote for 
neither candidate. Of those who supported primary losers, 44 percent 
said they would vote for the candidate who had defeated their primary 
preference, but they would not work for him. Six percent said they 
would vote for neither candidate, and 20 percent indicated that they 
would work for the other party. In general, the evidence suggests that 
a divisive primary limits the effectiveness of the party by reducing the 
number of campaign workers and voter support in the general election. 
The effects appear, however, to be temporary. There were no differences 
between winners and losers in response to future political activity and to 
serving a more responsible position in the party. 8 
6 Alan L. Clem and Kenneth J. Meier, "Another Look at the Effects of Divisive 
Party Primaries: The South Dakota Experience, 1964-1974," Public Affairs (Ver-
million, South Dakota: Governmental Research Bureau, University of South Dakota , 
1975) , pp. 1-4. 
7 Sorauf, Party Politics, n. 7, p. 218. 
8 Donald B. Johnson and James R. Gibson, "The Divisive Primary Revisited: 
Party Activists in Iowa," American Political Science Review, 68 (March, 1974), 67-77. 
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The findings of Johnson and Gibson may reflect in part the nature of 
the organizations they examine. They asked the candidates to supply 
the names of persons active in their campaigns. Their analysis treats, as 
a result, the effects of a divisive primary on candidate organization.• 
There may be little reason to expect a divisive primary to have similar 
effects on the regular party organization. Candidate organizations are 
committed to the candidates ; regulars may be committed to the party 
itseH. Activities and concerns of the regular organization may transcend 
individual candidacies. Candidates come and go, but the organization 
remains. Regulars may avoid any activity that jeopardizes or com-
promises the organization. Moreover , it seems that expectations asso-
ciated with official positions in th e party would demand a concerted 
effort on behalf of the party's candidates regardless of personal inclina-
tions. Consistent with this , Comer observes little difference between 
levels of general election support among party leaders who supported 
winners and losers in a highly divisive primary election. 10 It may be 
that regular organizational activists are uninfluenced by or rise above 
divisive primaries. 
None of the above studies deal with the impact of divisive primaries 
on general election success in terms of the number of votes a candidate 
receives. Highly contested primaries may make a difference in terms of 
a candidate's share of the general election vote but only rarly alter the 
outcome. Pierson and Smith address themselves to this possibility by 
examining all major party gubernatorial primaries from 1903 to 1968 
in all but eleven southern states. Treating divisiveness as an interval 
measure ( the winners percentage of the total vote for the two highest 
vote getters), the authors conclude that the relationship between primary 
divisiveness and general election vote is almost non existent. In both 
the Republican and Democratic party , divisiveness accounted for less 
than one percent of the variance in general election vote and the direc-
tion of relationships were opposite of expectations. That is, divisiveness 
added to a candidate 's share of the general election vote. These patterns 
remained with both incumbency and party competition controlled.11 
The research here continues this line of inquiry by examining the 
relationship between the percentage of the primary election vote at the 
county level for the winner of the primary state-wide, hereafter re-
ferred to as primary divisiveness , and the percentage of the party's vote 
9 This is revealed in the fact that 61 percent of the Johnson and Gibson group 
did not hold a party office at the time, and 48 percent had never held a party office. 
10 John Comer, "Another Look at the Effects of the Divisive Primary," American 
Politics Quarterly , 4 (January, 1976), 121-218. 
11 James E. Pierson and T . Smith, "Primary Divisiveness and General Election 
Success: A Re-examination," Journal af Politics, 37 (May, 1975), 555-562. 
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in the general election. Like Pierson and Smith, it treats primary divisive-
ness as an interval measure and relates divisiveness to candidate shares 
of the general election vote. However, it also examines the manner . in 
which the preferences and activities of party leaders influence the gen-
eral election vote. Thus , it focuses on a dimension of the thesis hereto-
fore ignored , the comparative influence of organizational and electoral 
divisions in the primary election. Key and Sorauf were concerned pri -
marily with the organizational consequences of divisive primaries. Hacker 
and others treat divisions among the rank and file. 
The Primary Elections in 1970 
The primary elections in Ohio in 1970 for governor and U. S. Senate 
provide an appropriate context for testing the divisive primary thesis. 
At the rank and file level, both parties were seriously divided over their 
nomination for governor and U. S. Senate. There were no incumbents 
running for re-election and all the candidates were well-known. The 
Republican gubernatorial primary found Roger Cloud contesting Donald 
Lukens and Paul Brown for the nomination. Cloud served several terms 
as state auditor and was for several years a dominant and powerful 
leader in the state legislature. Lukens, a congressman from southwestern 
Ohio, was a young and articulate spokesman for conservatism among 
Ohio Republicans. Brown was attorney general of the state. Cloud won 
nomination with 51 percent of the vote. In the Democratic Party, John 
Gilligan contested somewhat lesser known Democrats, Mark EcElroy 
and Robert Seeney. Gilligan had served a term in Congress and had 
been the party's nominee for U. S. Senate in 1968. Gilligan, a liberal, 
was not too popular with some conservative Democrats in the . state, 
but it was widely recognized that he had the be.st chance of winning 
the governorship. Sweeney had served several terms in Congress . Gilli-
gan won the primary with 60 percent of the vote. 
The Senate primary in the Republican Party found James Rhodes , 
a two term incumbent governor, contesting an incumbent congressman, 
Robert Taft , Jr. Before serving two terms as governor, Rhodes se~ed 
as state auditor , and before that, as mayor of Columbus. Taft was serv-
ing his third term in Congress, and had run for the Senate once before. 
Taft beat Rhodes with slightly less than 51 percent of the vote. The 
Democratic Party found nationally known John Glenn , contesting a 
highly expert long-time Democratic Party politician, Howard Metzen-
baum . Glenn achieved fame as an astronaut. Metzenbaum served as 
campaign manager for retiring Senator Steven Young in Young's previous 
Senate campaigns. Metzenbaum was also active in Democratic Party 
politics in C.uyahoga (Cleveland) County. Metzenbaum won the primary 
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with 46 percent of the vote. Less than 2 percent of the total vote 
separated the two candidates in what was a four man race. 12 In the 
general election, Taft defeated Metzenbaum by 70,000 votes and Gilligan 
defeated Cloud by 350,000. 
The party was likewise divided at the organizational level. As an 
indication, consider that 12 percent of the county chairmen in the 
Democratic Party preferred a loser in the party's gubernatorial primary 
and 62 percent preferred the loser in the Senate primary. Twenty-six 
percent of the Republican chairmen preferred a loser in their party's 
gubernatorial primary and 80 percent preferred the loser in the Senate 
primary. 13 While party chairmen are only one element of the local 
organization, they are an important element. They have considerable 
influence within the local organization and are often responsible for the 
party's campaign for state-wide offices within the counties. Any impact 
on the vote owing to the activity or inactivity of the party organization 
is likely to be revealed in the preferences and activities of the local 
county chairman. 
Methodology 
Primary divisiveness at the electoral level reflects the division of the 
vote among primary contestants. As the divisive primary thesis is de-
veloped in the literature, the concern is with the impact of supporting 
winners and losers in the primary election . Thus, primary divisiveness 
is defined as the percentage of the primary election vote at the county 
level received by the winner of the primary state-wide. The greater the 
nominee's percentage of the primary vote in the county, the less divisive 
the primary is considered to be. The smaller the percentage, the more 
divisive the primary is considered to be. The percentage for each county 
was subtracted from 100 so that higher values equal greater divisiveness. 
Data were taken from official primary election returns from each of 
Ohio's 88 counties for the gubernatorial and U. S. Senate primaries in 
May, 1970.14 
12 The Democratic Senate primary was a four man race, but two candidates were 
not considered serious contenders . 
18 Other evidence of division is suggested by the 40 percent in the Democratic 
Party who endorsed a loser in their party's Senate primary and the 41 and 27 percent 
respectively in the Republican Party who endorsed losers in their party's Senate and 
gubernatorial primaries. 
u Selected distributional characteristics of primary divisiveness 
Democratic Party Republican Party 
Gov. Sen. Gov. Sen. 
Primary) divisiveness 
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59% 
Standard Deviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7% 
Minimum ........................ 43% 
Maximum ........................ 74% 
62% 
9% 
50% 
84% 
56% 
11% 
35% 
82% 
59% 
5% 
51% 
72% 
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To assess the impact of prima ry divisiveness on general election 
vote, one should have a measure that takes into consideration the usual 
electoral performance of the parties in general elections for each office 
within each county; i.e., an expected party vote for each office in each 
county, one tl1at reflects the continuous overtime electoral strengths of 
the parties. An expected party vote was calculated for each office in 
each county by regressing each county's Republican percentage of the 
two party vote in the 1970 general election on the same percentage from 
three preceding general elections. For the governorship, these were 1958, 
1962, and 1966, for the U. S. Senate , 1962, 1964, and 1968. Here too, 
data were official general election returns from each county for both 
major parties for the office of governor and U. S. Senate. The residual 
variation , each county's actual vote minus its expected vote, is a measure 
which reflects influences on the election other than the long-term 
partisa n forces within each county. 15 
Support for winning and losing primary candidates among county 
chairmen was measured from responses to a mailed questionnaire. 16 
Following the general election, questionnaires were mailed to each 
chairman asking them which candidate they preferred in the primary , 
how strongly they preferred the candidate , and whether they endorsed 
and worked for the candidate. From these items, a number of simple 
15 Selected distributional characteristics of each county's actual vote minus its 
expected vote ( residual variation) by party and office: 
Gov. 0 Sen. 
Standard Deviation .6% .7% 
Minimum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -2.5 % -1.1 % 
Maximum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5% 2.9% 
0 The mean is, of course, zero for each office. 
Gov. 
.8% 
-2.0 % 
3.8% 
Sen. 
.8% 
-S.7 % 
1.0% 
16 Response rat e was 77% ( 68) for Democratic chairmen and 65% ( 57) for 
Republi can chairmen. A comparison of demographic and political characteristics of 
counties of chairmen responding with all counties suggests those responding are 
reasonably representative. 
Counties of 
Chairmen All 
Responding Counties 
Democratic Party 
Mean population density per square mile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 
Mean family income .... . .. . .. . . . ................. 10,049 
Mean education among males . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.6 
Mean percent Republi can vote for governor in 1970 . . . . 51 
Mean percent Republican vote for senator in 1970 . . . . . . 56 
Republican party 
Mean population density per square mile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429 
Mean family income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,310 
Mean education among males . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 
Mean percent Republican vote for governor in 1970 51 
Mean percent Republican vote for senator in 1970 54 
465 
10,162 
11.6 
55 
51 
321 
10,058 
12.6 
55 
50 
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scales were constructed. For example, chairmen were asked how 
strongly they favored their preferred candidate in their party's guberna-
torial and senate primaries: very strongly, quite strongly, somewhat 
strongly, not strongly at all. Chairmen who preferred a loser in the 
primary and indicated a very strong preference were scored -4, quite 
strong -3, somewhat strong -2 , and not strong at all -1. Chairm en 
who preferred the winner in the primary were scored 4, 3, 2, and 1 
respectively. The method was the same for having endorsed a candi date 
where there were three categories; public endorsement, private endors e-
ment, and no endorsement; and having worked for a candidate wh ere 
there were two; having worked and not having worked. Scores of each 
of these were also combined into a single cumulative scale.17 In the 
analysis that follows these scales as well as the measure of prim ary 
divisiveness outlined above are related to the measure reHecting differ-
ences between actual and expected party votes for the office of governor 
and U. S. Senate for each county. 
Analysis 
What then was the impact of the 1970 primaries in Ohio on the 
general election? The relationships between primary divisiveness and 
expected vote for each of the races are revealed in Table One. Contr ary 
to expectations, in the Democratic Party both the gubernatorial and 
Senate nominee did better than expected in the general election in 
counties where their primary opponent ran well. The relationship is 
particularly strong for the gubernatorial primary. On the average, the 
Republican vote in the general election declined 2.5 percent with each 
increment in divisiveness. In the Senate primary, the relationship is 
weaker, registering a decline of 1.3 percent with each unit increase in 
divisiveness. The Republican Party is, however, another matter. Here, 
17 Selected distributional characteristics of primary election support scales: 
Democratic Party Republican Party 
Gov. Sen. Goo. Sen. 
Primary preference 
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 --0.2 1.4 -1.3 
Standard Deviation . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 3.0 2.8 2.4 
Endorsed primary preference 
Mean .... . .. . .. . ............ 1.9 0.2 1.1 --0.6 
Standard Deviation . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.6 
Worked for primary preference 
Mean .. . . . .. . ............ . .. 1.4 0.1 0.9 --0.3 
Standard Deviation . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.0 
Cumulative Scale 
Mean ... ... ....... . . ... . . . .. 6.4 0.1 3.3 -2.2 
Standard Deviation .... . ...... 3.9 5.8 5.4 4.8 
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the expected relationship emerges for the gubrnatorial primary and is 
reasonably strong, but no relationship exists at all for the party's Senate 
primary. In the gubernatorial election, the party suffered a three per-
centage point decline on the average in its general election vote with 
each unit increase in divisiveness. 
TABLE ONE 
Primary Divisiveness and Deviation from Expected Republican Vote 
Democratic Party 
Gubernatorial 
Primary 
r b 
Senate 
Primary 
r b 
Republican Party 
Gubernatorial 
Primary 
r b 
Senate 
Primary 
, b 
Primary divisiveness 
( High score equals 
high divisiveness) -.26 -2.54 -.18 -1.33 -.41 -3.05 .Olns .OSW 
ns = not significant at .05. 
How is one to deal with these contradictory patterns? The findings 
here as well as in other studies support the general, if not satisfactory, 
conclusion that divisive primaries can harm a candidate's election 
prospects, but that harm is not the inevitable consequence of a divisive 
contest. If this is the case, the next step, it seems, is to begin to consider 
and explore some of the conditions that bear on the relationship between 
the divisive character of primary elections and general election per-
formance. Some possibilities are suggested in the above analysis. Con-
ceivable, one political party may find it more difficult to overcome di-
visions among its rank and file than another. One might expect, for 
example, that the more ideologically diverse a political party, the more 
difficult it would be to moderate the contentious spirit associated with 
a hotly contested primary. One would not want to claim, however, and 
the evidence, one suspects, would not support that the Republican 
party in Ohio is more ideological than the Democrats. 
The out-party, i.e., the party out of office, may also enjoy an ad-
vantage. Clem and Meier note that the publicity generated from a 
divisive primary may add to the visibility of the party's general election 
candidate, an advantage particularly against an incumbent office-holder. 
There may also be reasonably strong incentive for the party's rank and 
file to support the party's nominee, inspite of divisive primary, if the 
party has been out of office for some time. While there were no in-
cumbents running for re-election in either the gubernatorial or Senate 
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primaries in Ohio, the Republican Party controlled both the govern or-
ship and the Senate seat and had done so for several years. Findings 
here are consistent with an out-party advantage. 
Another factor is the nature of the primary itself and the nominee' s 
response to it. One can imagine closely contested primaries that are not 
antagonistic. The appeals of the contestants may be directed outwar d 
toward the opposition party rather than toward their fellow partis ans. 
Again, one might expect this if the opposition is incumbent. This may 
have been the case in the Democratic primaries in 1970. The nominee' s 
response to the primary can also make a difference. A conciliatory and 
reaching out may succeed in bringing the party together mitigatin g 
problems in the general election. . 
There is also some evidence to suggest that primary outcomes be ar 
more heavily on gubernatorial than Senate elections . Although one 
would not want to push the evidence from selected case studies too far, 
the difference may represent the greater perceived importance of the 
governorship to the interests of the voters and the party. The costs asso-
ciated with the loss of one's Senate preference, who would have been 
one among 100 senators, may be considered less than the costs associat ed 
with the loss of one's choice as the state's chief executive. 
There is also the possibility that local circumstances will interven e. 
For example, in Ohio prior to the primary elections Governor Rhodes, 
who lost the Republican Party's Senate nomination to Robert Taft, and 
State Auditor Roger Cloud, who won the party 's gubernatorial nomin a-
tion, were implicated in what became known as the state house loan 
scandal. It involved a series of poor and questionable investments of 
state monies to persons close to and involved with the Republic an 
Party, particularly Rhodes. This, no doubt, contributed to Rhodes' defeat 
in the primary and perhaps to Cloud's defeat in the general election and 
may explain the strong relationship observed in Table One. If this is 
true, it means that Cloud received his biggest primary challenge in 
those counties where the voters were most disturbed by the party' s 
involvement in the scandal, and willing to vote Democratic in November 
because of it, a distinct possibility. 
There is also the role of the party organization. It may not be a 
divisive primary per se that undermines a party 's or candidate's election 
prospects, but the failure of the party organization to rally aroun d its 
nominee and work for his/her election. Primary contests have the po-
tential to divide the party organization as well as the rank and file. 
It may be that these divisions are responsible for either losing or doing 
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Jess than expected in the general election. The party organization is, 
for example, responsible for campaigning and working for the election 
of its nominees. It can be a major instrument for activating supporters 
and stimulating them to participate. 18 If the organization fails in this, 
the party vote may suffer. A highly divisive primary at the electoral 
level may have little consequence for the general election if the party 
organization can unite. 
The data in Table Two bear on this issue. It revals the relationship 
between several dimensions of primary support on the part of the county 
party chairmen and deviations from the expected Republican vote. The 
loss of one's preferred candidate in the primary appears to have had 
little effect on the general election vote. All correlations are quite low 
and, with the exception of the Democratic gubernatorial primary, statis-
tically insignificant. While little should be made of such low correlations 
even when they are statistically significant, the modest negative rela-
tionship for the Democratic gubernatorial primary may point to prob-
lems Gilligan, a liberal candidate, had with a number of conservative 
party leaders. It may be that Gilligan, the overwhelming favorite of 
party leaders, did better than expected in the general election in counties 
where he was the preferred primary nominee of the county chairman. 
In any case, the general conclusion is that divisions among party leaders 
over the party's nominee revealed in the preferences and activities of 
the leadership seem to be unrelated or only modestly so to the general 
election vote. This may not be unexpected. As suggested earlier, ex-
pectations associated with involvement in the regular party may limit 
the influence of the regular organization on the vote. A professional 
orientation may characterize party leaders which limits the impact of 
candidate and/ or ideological divisions. In other words, party leaders 
are expected to perform in a way that contributes to the electoral success 
of the party regardless of their personal inclinations. One would not, 
however, expect this of personal campaign organizations. 
18 See for example William J. Crotty, "Party Effort and Its Impact on the Vote," 
American Political Science Review, 65 (June, 1971), 439-450, and the literature 
cited therein. 
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TABLE TWO 
Support for Primary Election Winner and Deviation from 
Expected Republican Vote 
Democratic Party Republican Party 
Gubernatorial 
Primary 
Preferred Primary Winner . . -.19° 
Endorsed Primary Winner . . - .13ns 
Worked for Primary Winner . . -.lOns 
Cumulative Support Scale . . . . -.17 
0 Denotes Pearson product moment correlation. 
ns = not significant at .05. 
Senate 
Primary 
.08ns 
.13ru 
.09ns 
.lOns 
Conclusion 
Gubernatorial 
Primary 
.09ns 
.02ns 
.12ns 
.06ns 
Senate 
Primary 
.02,ns 
.()(3na 
.()()na 
.()3nl 
Conventional wisdom and popular lore suggest that primary elec-
tions that divide a political party undermine the party's chances of 
of success in the general election. There are two components of this 
thesis that can be examined. One maintains that the rank and file of a 
party who support a loser in a hard fought primary will withhold their 
support for the party's nominee in the general election or defect and 
support the opposition. The other treats the party organization, activists 
and leaders, as an instrument for mobilizing the vote and maintains that 
organizations active and supportive of a loser in a "hotly" contested 
primary will be less active in the general election on behalf of the 
party's nominee. Less effort and activity means a lower vote for the 
party in the general election. 
The evidence from the primary elections in Ohio in 1970, although 
limited-it is drawn from a single state and single point in time-cannot 
dispute the first. Clearly, the general election vote for the Republican 
gubernatorial candidate in 1970 was lower than expected in counties 
where his primary vote was lower and higher in counties where his 
primary vote was higher. However , the opposite was true for both the 
Democratic gub ernatorial and Senate candidates and the vote for the 
Republican Senate candidate was unaffected by the primary outcome. 
The answer to the question "Does a divisive primary hurt a candidate's 
election chances?" appears to be an unsatisfactory but perhaps realistic, 
it depends. 
With respect to the 1970 elections , the Democrats were the out-
party and the Republicans were attempting to overcome a charge of 
corruption leveled at their outgoing Governor . As a result, the primary 
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campaign in the Democratic Party, particularly for the governorship, 
focused on the Governor, his and his party's shortcomings, rather than 
the other Democratic candidates. The Democratic gubernatorial primary 
was, as such, somewhat consensual serving to unite rather than divide. 
Just the opposite was true for the Republicans. Thus, being the out-
party, challenging an unpopular incumbent administration, and direct-
ing the primary campaign at the opposition may be factors that lessen 
the effects of divisive primaries. 
As for division among party leaders, this appears to have little or 
no influence on the vote. Whether a party chairmen supported, en-
dorsed, or worked for a winner or loser in the primary made no differ-
ence in the general election vote for the party. While this can mean a 
number of things, it seems that all county chairmen were reasonably 
active, performing a number of routine campaign activities on behalf 
of the party's candidate. Thus, support for a losing primary candidate 
did not have any electoral consequences. Whatever threat divisive 
primaries pose to election success, it appears that it operates through 
the party's rank and file rather than the party leadership. 
